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Abstract in English 
In the light of converging services for voice, data, and video, this paper discusses the challenges 
for telecommunications regulation from a European perspective. The Netherlands, a country 
with excellent conditions for facilities-based competition, is discussed as a case in point. With 
dynamic issues at the heart of the debate, the role of regulation and government intervention 
more generally is to create and possibly to sustain conditions among operators to upgrade their 
networks and to provide innovative services. A fresh look at current regulation suggests that an 
overhaul may be needed. 
 
Key words: telecommunications regulation, convergence, network access, IP networks, 
competition, innovation, NGN networks 
 
JEL code: L96, L5. 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
In het licht van convergerende diensten voor spraak, data en beeld bespreekt dit paper de 
uitdagingen voor telecommunicatieregulering vanuit een Europees perspectief. Nederland, een 
land met uitstekende condities voor infrastructuurconcurrentie, wordt besproken als een 
illustratief voorbeeld. Met dynamische ontwikkelingen centraal in het debat verschuift de rol 
van regulering en overheidsinterventie naar het creëren en mogelijk ondersteunen van de 
voorwaarden waaronder operators hun netwerken vernieuwen en innovatieve diensten 
verschaffen. Een nadere kijk op de huidige vorm van regulering laat zien dat een herijking 
nodig is. 
 
Steekwoorden: telecommunicatieregulering, convergentie, netwerktoegang, IP netwerken, 
nieuwe generatie netwerken, mededinging, innovatie   4   5 
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Summary 
With the emergence of voice telephony based on the Internet Protocol (VoIP), 
telecommunications markets are rapidly changing. The application of the Internet Protocol (IP) 
helps operators to digitize their services in a coordinated fashion, which greatly facilitates the 
delivery of different services (voice, data, video) over any type of network, e.g. Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL), cable, or mobile. This development, known as convergence, may 
ultimately lead to a decoupling of services and platforms: any service can be offered over any 
network (unless operators incorporate restrictions into their networks). This is a drastic change 
for the telecommunications sector: incumbents have to adapt to the new reality, and they are 
challenged by newcomers from unexpected directions, sometimes with very innovative business 
models. 
Convergence and innovation have strong implications for market structure and competition. 
As a consequence, these developments must be taken into account by sector-specific regulation 
and competition policy. This paper explores and discusses the challenges for regulation as 
imposed by convergence and the emergence of IP-based services, with a focus on innovation 
and investment incentives. It adopts a European perspective, and discusses the situation in the 
Netherlands in some more detail. This country can be seen as one of the frontrunners in Europe 
with regard to the development of competing infrastructures: the presence of competing 
networks with nationwide coverage brings the option of regulatory withdrawal to the forefront 
(within the EU). However, some regulatory issues that come to the surface in the Dutch context 
do not have immediate relevance for those countries in which nationwide network duplication is 
not an option in the near future. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all aspects 
of regulation and competition policy, to a large extent the focus is on the changing role of 
access regulation, and how it relates to incentives to innovate and invest. 
Our central findings are as follows. First of all, regulatory practice may need a drastic 
overhaul in order to be able to accept convergence. The current practice, based on fragmented 
markets definitions, is artificial and not in line with business strategies and consumers’ 
perceptions of electronic services. Voice, internet and TV services are all forms of IP-based 
communication. Thus, this approach introduces serious risks of reducing welfare. Second, 
depending on country-specific characteristics, it may no longer be appropriate to see access 
regulation (and in particular, access regulation of unbundling) as an instrument to promote 
competition and investments by moving entrants upwards on the “ladder of investments”. 
Rather, in countries with good prospects for facilities-based competition (for instance if there is 
national coverage of both DSL and a cable networks) dynamic efficiency may be improved 
substantially by stimulating a race of network investments. This issue may also require an 
overhaul of regulation, this time because of the need for symmetric (de-)regulation with respect 
to mandatory access, irrespective of whether networks have SMP. Additional challenges for 
regulation (and policy) are to consider the option of bill-and-keep for all network   8 
interconnection, to assess the risks of discriminatory practices that may undermine net 
neutrality of the internet, to reassess the need for universal service obligations, and finally, to 
upgrade the institutional environment in order to implement a transition from ex ante to ex post 
intervention (except in specific cases such as simple interconnection pricing rules, as mentioned 
above). 
   9 
1  Introduction 
With the emergence of voice telephony based on the Internet Protocol (VoIP), 
telecommunications markets are rapidly changing. The application of the Internet Protocol (IP) 
helps operators to digitize their services in a coordinated fashion, which greatly facilitates the 
delivery of different services (voice, data, video) over any type of network, e.g. Digital 
Subscriber Line (DSL), cable, or mobile. This development, known as convergence, may 
ultimately lead to a decoupling of services and platforms: any service can be offered over any 
network (unless operators incorporate restrictions into their networks). This is a drastic change 
for the telecommunications sector: incumbents have to adapt to the new reality, and they are 
challenged by newcomers from unexpected directions, sometimes with very innovative business 
models. 
Industry observers tend to agree that in order to survive, incumbent telcos will ultimately 
have to migrate to IP-based networks. Migration to a single broadband IP network allows 
incumbents to compete with cable networks by offering broadband “multiplay” services, such 
as IP TV. Coming from the other direction, cable operators are upgrading their networks to 
allow media services to run over IP. In addition, fixed wireless technologies (e.g. WiMAX and 
Wi-Fi) are becoming stronger substitutes to wireline broadband networks. With some 
qualifications, this also holds for third generation (3G) mobile networks. Thus, one observes an 
increasing variety of networks that are offering converging applications, sometimes in bundles. 
Convergence and innovation have strong implications for market structure and competition. 
As a consequence, these developments must be taken into account by sector-specific regulation 
and competition policy. This paper explores and discusses the challenges for regulation as 
imposed by convergence and the emergence of IP-based services, with a focus on innovation 
and investment incentives.
1 It adopts a European perspective,
2 and discusses the situation in the 
Netherlands in some more detail. This country can be seen as one of the frontrunners in Europe 
with regard to the development of competing infrastructures: the presence of competing 
networks with nationwide coverage brings the option of regulatory withdrawal to the forefront 
(within the EU). However, some regulatory issues that come to the surface in the Dutch context 
do not have immediate relevance for those countries in which nationwide network duplication is 
not an option in the near future. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss all aspects 
of regulation and competition policy, to a large extent the focus is on the changing role of 
access regulation, and how it relates to incentives to innovate and invest. 
In the electronic communications sector, an important challenge for regulation is to keep up 
with technological change and innovation. In general, it has to be addressed to what extent the 
expected benefits of a specific type of regulatory intervention outweigh the costs. Perhaps the 
 
1 Throughout the paper, it is supposed that maximization of welfare measured as total surplus (the unweighted sum of 
producer and consumer rents) is the objective of regulation. In reality, some regulators put particular emphasis on consumer 
surplus. For the discussion here, this distinction has no consequences. 
2 Because of the institutional situation, parts of the discussion will not apply to the US.   10 
main difficulty is that in highly innovative markets—where the potential dynamic efficiency 
gains are substantial—it is so hard to foresee how the market will develop, while at the same 
time, intervening in the market may easily distort or, worse, undermine the potential for 
innovation. Thus, both the stakes and the risks are high, and hence the importance of assessing 
the optimal nature of regulatory intervention. 
Various other papers and publications explore the future of telecommunications regulation. 
A recent example is a collection of essays published by Ofcom (2006), providing a broad and 
comprehensive overview of changes in the telecoms landscape. In that collection, Stelzer (2006) 
argues that market forces and not regulators should choose winning technologies; Waverman 
(2006) assesses the changing costs and benefits of ex ante regulation versus ex post competition 
policy; Cave (2006a) makes a case for relying more on market-mechanism tools; and Booth 
(2006) argues that regulators should focus on the competitive process rather than trying to 
create a hypothetical outcome of perfect competition. Cave et al. (2006) also examine likely 
technological changes in European telecoms markets over the next decade, and the effects on 
competition. In the light of these changes, they argue in favour of regulatory disengagement. 
Finally, while the paper at hand provides regulatory guidelines for making sure that the 
converged future will not be delayed, a study by Bijlsma and Van Dijk (2007) anticipate such a 
future and discuss optimal regulation in a situation of a duopoly of triple-play providers. Note 
that because of the high rate of technological change in telecoms, implicitly this paper also 
connects to the literature on the relationship between regulation and innovation. There are 
research avenues on this topic into various applications. See, for instance, Prieger (2002) for an 
example of empirical work in this field on telecoms, and the references therein. 
Concerning methodology, note that this paper does not follow a standard research approach 
(e.g. based on theoretical or empirical modelling), but builds on insights from existing literature 
and tries to provide a “well-educated” perspective on the future of telecoms regulation. To a 
modest extent, this paper affords to be somewhat speculative. As a consequence, the 
recommendations may not be very specific in certain respects, and sometimes require further 
research (which will be pointed out). Nevertheless, it is hoped that the paper adds focus to the 
current policy debate, as well as raises some issues for further research. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of recent developments 
in the Netherlands, a country which can be seen as a frontrunner in Europe, based on the 
prospects for facilities-based competition, that is, competition between infrastructures. Section 
3 discusses the challenges for regulation. Section 4 revisits the situation in the Netherlands by 
discussing the implications that apply specifically to the Netherlands. Section 5 concludes the 
paper by recapitulating the main challenges and tradeoffs for regulation.   11 
2  The broadband market in the Netherlands 
This section describes recent developments in the Dutch broadband market, in order to have a 
reference point for later discussion.
3 
In March 2006, DSL operators (including incumbent KPN) had a market share of about 
60%, cable operators around 39%, and Fiber to the Home (FTTH) around 1% for broadband 
access. Thus, the market was basically divided between DSL, as the dominant network, and 
cable. These data do not display the small but growing importance of alternative broadband 
networks, for instance based on mobile standards (Wi-Fi, WiMAX, UMTS). The latter one, the 
3G mobile telephony standard in Europe, may not offer the same speed as fixed connections, 
but one may expect that it will gradually become more important as an additional source of 
competitive pressure on fixed networks. 
The 1% share of FTTH looks insignificant, but it hides the fact that recently, there has been 
a lot of activity in FTTH rollout. According to a report by Stratix (2007), parties ranging from 
KPN, cable operators, municipalities, housing corporations, to student dormitory corporations, 
had an aggregate deployment of about 111,000 FTTH connections at the end of 2006. Based on 
publicly announced plans by various parties, the expectation is that this number will increase to 
377,000 during 2007, and 579,000 during 2009. Underlying this trend are small-scale projects 
carried out in cooperation with housing corporations as well as city-wide projects coordinated at 
a larger scale. 
In 2001, the market share of cable was 76%, substantially larger than in 2006. It is probably 
with the help of DSL providers that built their business on regulated local loop unbundling 
(LLU) that DSL has become so successful. The competitive pressure that former monopolists in 
Europe experience, stems in large parts from mandatory unbundling at the level of the “main 
distribution frame” (MDF), enabling competitors to target end-users without the need to invest 
in their own local loops. Note that the Netherlands is not the only country where local loop 
unbundling creates competitive pressure both in broadband and voice markets. 
Within the DSL segment, KPN had a market share of around 80% in March 2006, which 
includes the share gained by recent acquisitions of Tiscali and other DSL providers. The most 
important remaining DSL providers were BBned (owned by Telecom Italia) with a market 
share of about 8%, Versatel (owned by Tele2) with a market share of 8%, and Wanadoo (owned 
by Orange) with a market share of 4% (data from 2006). As of the beginning of 2007, these 
providers have their networks rolled out up to the level of the main distribution frame. For the 
remaining part, they rely on access to unbundled connections. Note that due to the takeovers by 
KPN, the competitive pressure from DSL providers without local networks has been reduced 
substantially. 
 
3 Most of the quantitative data presented in this section is taken from Analysys (2007).   12 
As a part of its “all-IP” strategy, KPN announced (in 2006) to scrap most of its local exchanges 
containing main distribution frames.
4 
5According to this plan KPN would keep some as “metro 
core locations”, but would dismantle the main distribution frames at these locations. The link 
between these metro core locations and street cabinets (currently about 28,000) would be 
converted into fibre. Upgrading local access connections is important since at present, DSL 
connections have insufficient capacity to provide media services of similar quality as those 
provided by cable operators. Migrating the local loop to IP can be done by upgrading access 
networks to Very High Speed DSL (VDSL), through fibre to the street cabinet, or to FTTH. 
KPN’s local loop can be unbundled at another level, besides the level of the main 
distribution frame. An alternative is access at sub-loop levels (sub-loop unbundling or SLU). 
Note that if KPN upgrades its network according to current plans, entrants will no longer be 
able to purchase access at either level. It is not clear, however, whether policy makers should 
worry about this (this issue will be revisited later). Apart from rolling out connections to end-
users themselves, the remaining option would then be to use wholesale broadband access 
(WBA), a form of service-based entry. Whereas unbundling results in access to the legacy 
infrastructure of the incumbent, wholesale broadband access will lead to access to the overall 
network, including the core parts upgraded to IP. 
In the light of KPN’s move to all-IP, the Dutch NRA, OPTA, has to decide whether it will 
allow KPN to redesign its network in such a way that competitors’ investments at local switches 
(in the main distribution frame) become obsolete, or that unbundling at a lower level will be 
ruled out. In a 2006 position paper, OPTA indicated that currently granted access can, in 
principle, not be withdrawn, and that “reasonable” access requests must be granted as well.
6 
Consequently, conditions would be imposed on KPN with regard to its plans to phase out the 
current type of access (at the MDF). At the beginning of 2007, however, OPTA provisionally 
concluded that alternative types of access (e.g. through SLU) would most likely not lead to a 
fully fledged alternative for unbundling at the MDF level.
7 OPTA argued that a necessary 
condition for allowing KPN to phase out MDF access is the presence of sufficient possibilities 
for entry and continuity of service provision by entrants. Subsequently, OPTA obliged KPN to 
come up with a solution that is acceptable to all involved parties, with respect to the proposed 
phase-out of access to KPN’s local switches.
8 
 
4 “Dutch Regulator Jumps to Altnets’ Aid”, Telecommunications Online, October 3, 2006 
http://www.telecommagazine.com/newsglobe/article.asp?HH_ID=AR_2447. 
5 BT, in contrast, will not dismantle its local exchanges as part of its upgrade to a NGN (the “21st century network”). 
6 “KPN’s Next Generation Network: All-IP”, position paper by OPTA, OPTA/BO/2006/202771, 3 October 2006. Available at 
www.opta.nl. 
7 “Brief aan marktpartijen inzake vervolg op position paper All-IP”, letter by OPTA, 24 January 2007. Available at 
www.opta.nl. 
8 “ALL-IP: agreement between parties”, background document by OPTA, 13 July 2007. Available at www.opta.nl.   13 
Summarizing, at present the two main networks are DSL and cable, while various local 
initiatives are pushing up the share of FTTH. Thanks to unbundling, the DSL network is 
currently used by DSL providers without local networks. It depends on KPN’s implementation 
of its all-IP plans and on OPTA’s requirements on KPN’s new network to what extent these 
DSL providers can remain active in the market, if they choose to stick to their current business 
models. In what follows, the regulatory options with regard to mandating access in the light of 
the planned investments in networks will be discussed.   14   15 
3  Regulation and market dynamics 
This section derives, in broad outlines, the type of regulatory regime that aims at maximizing 
dynamic efficiency, or total surplus in the long run. To do this, it starts by comparing different 
regulatory regimes in a hypothetical exercise (section 3.1). Next, several important challenges 
for policy and regulation of electronic communications markets are discussed, which need to be 
addressed if policy makers want to create sustainable conditions for competition and maximum 
consumer benefits in the long run (section 3.2). 
Before going into details, it is useful to make explicit why regulation should not primarily 
aim at creating competition and low retail prices in the short run (an outcome that can easily be 
obtained). The reason is that the potential welfare gains that result from innovation are likely to 
be significantly higher, probably of a different order of magnitude, even though typically, they 
require a longer time horizon. Therefore, to maximize welfare, the policy goal should be to 
create a sustainable environment in which operators have incentives to innovate and invest in 
their networks, and where consumers gradually experience the introduction of innovative 
services and more variety. See Stelzer (2006) for more background and references on the 
importance of innovation as a driver of welfare. 
3.1  Regulatory regimes 
Consider a hypothetical exercise in which three regulatory regimes—two of which are 
hypothetical at present—are compared. In each case, one can think of a situation in which, 
initially, there are (at least) two networks. Thus, this exercise is tailored to highlight the 
situation in the Netherlands. Both operators offer triple play bundles. One is a DSL network 
operated by the former incumbent, who has been forced to provide unbundled local connections 
to entrants at regulated prices. The other one is, for instance, a cable network, which has not 
been regulated, except for traditional media regulation, which will be ignored in this discussion. 
Alternatively, it may be that both networks are subject to regulation, but that because of 
different “Significant Market Power” (SMP) assessments in the “relevant product and service 
markets” recommended by the EC,
9 only the DSL operator has had to provide access at a 
regulated price. The former incumbent is considering to upgrade its DSL network to an all-IP 
network. There are several DSL providers without local networks, purchasing unbundled access 
to the DSL network, who are active in the retail market as well.  
The central idea in this exercise is, in a situation with good prospects for facilities-based 
competition, to consider the whole range of options for access regulation. The regulator now 
has to decide whether its policy with regard to access regulation needs to be revised in the light 
of the new market reality. 
 
9 Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21 [2003] OJ L 114/45.   16 
Regime I: Continuation. First, suppose that there is no change in regulation while technologies 
are upgraded. Hence, the DSL network has to (continue to) provide regulated MDF access to 
entrants, whereas the cable operator does not have to do so. Although the DSL operator may 
feel that mandated access undermines its business case for upgrading its network to VDSL or 
FTTH, it actually has no choice if it wants to stay competitive with regard to the cable operator. 
Nevertheless its incentives to innovate are likely to be harmed, and to a certain extent the 
network upgrade may be a response to the regulatory reality. Moreover, because of asymmetric 
regulation, the playing field is unlevelled and both operators’ incentives to invest are likely to 
be distorted even more. The same is true for entrants who currently do not have local networks. 
Since rolling out a network is not necessary, entrants (continue to) have weak incentives to do 
so. 
 
Regime II: Broadening of regulation. Second, suppose regulation fastens its grip by mandating 
access, under the same conditions, to all networks. Note that in case of a strict implementation 
(by NRA’s or the Commission) of the requirement of the European regulatory framework that 
there must be SMP, this is not straightforward. But for the sake of argument, assume that this is 
feasible nevertheless. As a result, at least in the short run, consumers get competitive triple play 
bundles on either network, offered by both networks as well as by entrants without networks. 
The question is, however, whether the two networks will have sufficient incentives to invest in 
the longer run. It is possible that their incentives to invest are eroded, since entrants can free 
ride on the existing local networks. 
 
Regime III: Overhaul of current regulation. Third, consider the other end of the range of 
regulatory options, by supposing that regulation loosens its grip completely by abandoning 
access regulation. Now there is unfettered facilities-based competition between networks who, 
in order to avoid the “commodity trap”, will probably aim at building up market power through 
differentiation.
10 A straightforward way to do so is to strike exclusive deals, or vertically 
integrate, with content providers. Accordingly, subscribers to the DSL network get content with 
different characteristics than those subscribing to the cable network.
11 Because of symmetric 
non-regulation, there is a level playing field. The DSL and cable operators, having full 
discretion over their strategies, try to capture rents from the content layer by leaving network 
neutrality behind. In order to increase the size of the retail market, or to serve niches beyond 
 
10 See Crawford (2007) for casual evidence, illustrations, and references that support the move towards product 
differentiation strategies for networks. In addition, firms may enjoy market power due to the presence of consumer search 
costs and consumer switching costs. The latter arise e.g. due to long-term contracts or costly number portability. While 
differentiation typically leads to more market power, the effect of consumer switching costs on competitive pressure is 
ambiguous (see e.g. Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). 
11 One possibility is that the content that is provided is the same on both networks, but that there are differences in delivery 
speed and priorities. See also the discussion on network neutrality, below. Note that there is a more prominent role for 
competition policy to avoid anti-competitive exclusive dealing arrangements as part of the networks’ differentiation strategy. 
Oversight by the competition authority can then assure that networks offer fairly homogeneous products.   17 
their immediate reach, they may nevertheless provide access to DSL providers, but access 
prices will then be based on commercial rather than regulatory considerations. Note that, if 
current regulation is withdrawn, there may nevertheless be some scope to introduce rules related 
to non-discrimination, in order to restore network neutrality. Also, having some interconnection 
rules (terminating access) may be efficient. Section 3.2 will revisit minimal regulations of these 
types. 
 
To conclude the hypothetical experiment, the obvious question now is which regime is best for 
welfare in the long run. As discussed briefly above, the conditions to obtain these goals appear 
to be most prominently present in regime III, although there an emerging uncertainty pertains to 
the discriminatory strategies of networks. Such strategies, however, will also come to the 
surface in regimes I and II. In what follows, the insights of this hypothetical experiment will be 
implicitly used as a working hypothesis, on which policy recommendations will be based. 
Section 4 will provide further support for this hypothesis, illustrated by the situation in the 
Netherlands. Underlying this hypothesis is a welfare comparison between facilities-based 
competition and access-based competition (entrants using the incumbent’s local connections 
rather then building them themselves). In general, one cannot say that one type of competition 
is socially optimal, as the outcome depends on, among others, the size of scale economies and 
investment costs.
12 Note that in the Netherlands, where two networks are already present (the 
investments are sunk), the downside of facilities-based competition stemming from wasteful 
duplication is largely irrelevant. Therefore, for this particular country, the working hypothesis 
seems to be on the safe side. Note, however, that for other countries, it may not apply. 
3.2  Regulatory challenges 
In the light of sustainable, long-term regulatory goals, one may consider several challenges for 
regulation of the electronic communications sector, primarily from the perspective of access 
regulation and incentives to invest and innovate. After that the paper will discuss some more 
general issues. 
 
1.  Consistent and neutral regulation of converging services, infrastructures and technologies 
 
Convergence of both services and of infrastructure is, thanks to the increased use of IP, no 
longer hype.
13 Voice, content and data are all digitally stored and transported files containing 
information. Fixed and mobile infrastructures (e.g. DSL, cable, and UMTS) do have their 
specific characteristics and functionalities, but they are becoming closer substitutes. These 
developments urgently call for consistent regulation that is, moreover, technologically neutral. 
 
12 See Bergman (2004) for an elaborate paper on this topic. 
13 See the survey on telecoms convergence “Your television is ringing” in The Economist, 14 October 2006.   18 
The extent to which this is possible, though, will depend on the extent to which regulatory 
frameworks allow for treating different services and different networks in the same way. 
Telecoms regulation has a tradition of heavily relying on detailed market definitions. In the 
EU, NRAs have little discretion in deviating from the European Commission’s 
“Recommendation on relevant product and service markets”,
14 specifying 18 different relevant 
markets. In the revised framework, this number is reduced to 7, but the underlying philosophy 
remains unchanged.
15 National circumstances may give rise to the adoption of different market 
definitions, but the practice is that that happens only under exceptional circumstances.
16 
Because of convergence and the adoption of IP, one can less and less distinguish the type of 
communication service or content that consumers purchase. Moreover, content often makes use 
of different ways of communication at the same time (e.g. a TV show where viewers can deliver 
input by making calls or sending short text messages). One can ask why, now that cable and 
DSL networks compete by offering triple play (voice, internet and TV) or quadruple play 
(including mobile services) bundles, such a fine-meshed division of the communications market 
is still appropriate. The distinctions between the networks will be reduced further due to 
upgrading of the networks. Arguably, these fragmented market definitions should be replaced 
by a market definition reflecting the business strategies of networks, the way consumers 
perceive electronic communications and media services, and the fact that the segments 
distinguished by the Commission’s Recommendation are closely linked to one another, for 
instance because of call traffic across segments.
17 Distinguishing separate segments, and 
applying regulatory measures in response to assessments of SMP within segments, is highly 
artificial and, more importantly, introduces serious risks of distorting the decisions to upgrade 
networks and hence of reducing welfare. 
To come back to the starting point, which is convergence, if regulation continues to rely on 
segmented market definitions, then it will be harder for NRAs to accept convergence as a new 
reality. Another risk, pointed out by Richards (2006), is that the marketplace evolves so rapidly 
that market boundary assessments will always lag behind. 
  
 
14 Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic 
communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21 [2003] OJ L 114/45. 
15 Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector 
susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (second edition), Brussels, C(2007) 
5406 rev 1. 
16 In the same spirit, the elimination of various markets from the Commission’s list implies a substantially higher threshold for 
regulation of those markets. 
17 Loomis and Swann (2006) make a similar comment based on the competitive situation in the US communications market. 
See also De Bijl et al. (2005) for a similar point in the context of the interconnection between fixed and mobile networks.   19 
2.  New role for access regulation 
 
NRA’s have been aiming at increasing consumer welfare by stimulating entry into 
telecommunications markets. This has been working (with mixed success) for several years 
now, through mandating access to incumbents’ networks. As a result, various types of entrants 
have become active. Some of them invested very little, and purchased all network capacity on 
the wholesale market. Others rolled out partial networks and reached end-users by leasing 
unbundled local loops. This was driven by regulation of call origination charges and rentals for 
(unbundled) local loops. The underlying idea was that, since rolling out networks is very costly 
and takes considerable time, by mandating access to existing networks, competition could get 
off the ground faster. Moreover, these regulatory arrangements were considered to be temporary 
“stepping stones”, helping entrants to build up market share and gradually roll out facilities 
themselves. 
The idea of using access regulation to stimulate network rollout is known as the “ladder of 
investment”. 
18The views on its success are mixed. In a speech, Ms Viviane Reding (member of 
the European Commission responsible for Information Society and Media), was rather positive 
and optimistic (Reding, 2006). Some empirical evidence is less positive, however (Hausman 
and Sidak, 2005; Crandall, 2006). Waverman (2006) cites evidence that the share of cable has 
suffered because of mandated access to the incumbent’s network. It should be noted here that 
(to some extent) it may not be the underlying idea that is flawed, but that the implementation 
and credible commitment to the policy by regulators are problematic.
19 Especially the lack of 
commitment devices for NRAs should be underlined in this respect. Concerning 
implementation, this type of policy requires considerable fine-tuning by regulators. Even if 
regulators manage to do this correctly, fast technological developments and changing political 
realities may pull the intended policy off course.
20 Thus it is uncertain whether regulators are 
able to commit to a certain regulatory policy over a period of several years. 
In countries with good prospects for facilities-based competition, mandated network access 
can easily lead to avoidable distortions of market outcomes.
21 Typically, there are good 
prospects for competition between networks if there are nationwide cable networks rolled out 
alongside the incumbent’s network. More generally, in countries where (i) cable operators are 
getting ready to offer voice and internet, and are becoming triple-play providers, and (ii) 
additional networks (e.g. based on Wi-Fi, WiMAX, or FTTH) can be used for fast internet 
 
18 On the relation between access prices and investments, see e.g. De Bijl and Peitz (2002), Cave and Vogelsang (2003) 
and Valletti (2003b). The central idea of the ladder of investment is that entry may initially be encouraged by low access 
prices— most likely, entrants will start investing in replicable assets, and while access prices increase over time, move on to 
less replicable ones (such as local networks). For a recent, much broader survey see Guthrie (2006). 
19 Cave (2006b) sets out a stepwise implementation for regulators. 
20 For an interesting example that demonstrates implementation difficulties, see De Bijl and Peitz (2005), discussing OPTA’s 
five-year plan for an increasing local-loop line rental in order to give entrants incentives to move up on the investments 
ladder, and explaining why it did not work out as intended. 
21 See also Booth (2006) and Waverman (2006).   20 
access in certain areas, the rationale behind access regulation as a means to stimulate network 
investments becomes less convincing. This is even more so in the light of the fact that setting 
the access price correctly is inherently difficult, while setting it at the wrong level may heavily 
distort investment incentives. Thus, before considering access regulation, the first question to be 
addressed is how many networks are needed to have effective competition. If a given number of 
players do not lead to sufficiently effective competition, some form of access regulation might 
be desirable, provided that less heavy-handed means do not work, and that it does not distort 
investments in new networks. In addition, if these conditions are satisfied, networks (read: cable 
and DSL) should, if technically possible, be treated symmetrically, in order to  
maintain a level playing field.
22 
23 
Regulators should bear in mind that even if there is little scope for facilities-based 
competition, access regulation is risky. This point seems to be underestimated in practice. For 
instance, in a recent public discussion document on next generation access networks, Ofcom 
states that “[...] one key consideration for any next generation access regulatory policy is the 
correct level in the network to mandate access to promote downstream competition. This will, 
in part, depend on technology choices made by industry.” (1.15, p. 3). The view expressed in 
the Ofcom document seems to ignore the endogeneity of technological decisions, that is, that an 
industry’s technology choices will to a large extent be determined by the regulatory policy. It is 
because of the risk of lock-in into certain technologies, which can easily be triggered by 
regulation geared towards specific types of access, that it is wise to be very careful. 
While it is not completely certain whether facilities-based competition will be feasible in the 
long run, regulation can—in a different way—contribute to creating an arena in which firms 
invest and innovate to create the most attractive network.
24 To make such a “race of network 
investments” happen, access regulation should be used less prominently as an instrument to 
create competition in the short run. Instead, it can be put on hold and used as a threat that can be 
applied at some point in case a new network monopoly prevails. Of course, firms should know 
the regulatory rules of the game in advance, so that there is little risk of regulatory uncertainty 
or even a regulatory “hold-up”. Hence the regulator must be able to create a credible 
commitment to stick to (in advance) clearly defined objectives and criteria in the future. 
Regulation should also take into account the risk that firms will temper the speed of innovation 
or price less aggressively, as they foresee that winning the race may trigger the regulator to 
capture the rents from innovation. This can be dealt with by making sure that some monopoly 
rents are granted. 
  
 
22 To reduce the intensity of competition, firms may tacitly agree to divide the market geographically, e.g. leading to a FTTH 
network in one city and a cable network in another one. Therefore, to assess competition, the focus should be on sufficiently 
narrow geographical markets. 
23 This paper abstracts from the possibility of having competing networks based on the same technology, although this is 
certainly a possibility in some market segments. 
24 See also Stelzer (2006).   21 
3.  Network neutrality and non-discrimination 
 
When network operators strike exclusive deals, or vertically integrate, with content providers, 
non-discrimination may need to be put more prominently on the policy agenda. While there has 
been a heated policy debate on network neutrality in the US, it seems that Europe is lagging 
behind.
25 
26 From an economics perspective, a central issue is whether competition between 
networks can alleviate the harm of discriminatory practices on consumers’ choices and 
innovation.
27 If there are several networks and there is sufficient competition between them, 
discriminatory practices may do relatively little harm, as consumers can switch to other 
networks if they are not happy with the (limitations in the use of) content provided by their 
operator. However, it is hard to assess whether there is sufficient competition between 
networks, especially when they aim at horizontal differentiation through vertical contracting 
with different suppliers. The larger the number of networks, the less likely it is that such 
arrangements effectively limit consumers’ choices between content packages. The same is true 
for the potential harm to dynamic efficiency if the possibilities and incentives for decentralized 
innovation (at the “edges” of networks) are undermined by vertical restrictions and less open 
networks. It is an open question how many competing networks are needed to repair the harm 
from exclusive vertical contracting. However, market forces are to be checked by competition 
authorities, who can restrict or prohibit the use of certain types of vertical restraints. They may 
also interfere in attempts of vertical integration and even enforce vertical separation. 
A broader point is that it is hard to see how networks can add value as gatekeepers in a 
world where consumers desire plain functionality (voice, e-mail, unlimited access to the 
internet), reliable connections without binding capacity constraints, and access to whatever they 
want to see. If this correctly represents what consumers value most, then separate network 
layers, with competition in each layer and without “smart” gatekeepers, is likely to provide the 
best environment for innovation that aims at satisfying consumers’ needs.
28 Nevertheless, in the 
recent past network operators sometimes tended to vertically integrate (or strike exclusive 
deals) with content providers,
29 sometimes even to the extent of creating “walled gardens” and 
by blocking certain services provided by independent providers. The underlying business 
rationale seems to be to control access and content, in order to capture rents. Moreover, this 
 
25 One can loosely characterize network neutrality as the situation in which the internet is operated under non-discrimination: 
all packets transmitted over the network are treated the same way by the networks, including the traffic originating within the 
operator’s network. 
26 A possible reason why there is less debate about network neutrality in the EU may be found in the presence of a 
regulatory framework for electronic communications, which is absent in the US. 
27 See Kocsis and De Bijl (2007) and Van Schewick (2007). 
28 Farrell and Katz (2000) analyze when a monopoly network may, by extracting rents in the competitive sector, weaken or 
even destroy independent innovation. Possibly, such effects remain relevant if there is more than one network. 
29 Exclusive deals may, in particular be in the interest of the content owner since it increases the bargaining power of the 
content owner vis-à-vis the network operator.   22 
may lead to foreclosure and harm competition.
30 Hence, in the light of the dual danger of 
reduced incentives for innovation and reduced competition, NRA’s and competition authorities 
should critically scrutinize vertical ties between networks and content providers. 
The issues above have in common that they centre around access regulation and the 
incentives to invest and innovate. For the sake of completeness, also a couple of more general 
issues will be discussed, which are less dependent on country-specific characteristics than the 
previous ones. 
 
4.  Interconnection agreements 
 
Some bottlenecks may remain existent even when there is facilities-based competition in local 
networks. In particular, terminating access may always remain suspect, especially if operators 
continue to charge for it. The reason is that at the moment when somebody wants to make a call 
to a specific subscriber, the operator who has access to that subscriber (because of the 
subscription contract between the customer and the network) has (a certain amount of) market 
power.
31 This problem is probably most serious for call termination on mobile networks, where 
the location of the called person may be unknown at the time of calling, so that alternatives 
ways of reaching that customer (e.g. through a fixed line) may not be present. Nevertheless, to 
some extent, this issue is relevant for more types of terminating access, if not because of the 
exercise of market power, then because of inefficiencies caused by double marginalization (if 
access prices are set unilaterally) or collusion (if access prices are negotiated among 
operators).
32 
With the migration from circuit-switched telephony to packet-switched IP traffic, wide-scale 
adoption of bill-and-keep in interconnection agreements may solve inefficiencies caused by 
mark-ups in call termination prices. It is important to note that bill-and-keep may, in theory, not 
lead to optimal price levels, which will typically be equal to underlying marginal cost levels. 
However, especially with the introduction of IP, marginal costs levels are approaching zero. In 
addition, bill-and-keep substantially reduces regulatory and transaction costs: this type of 
pricing does neither require cost monitoring by operators (or NRAs) nor adjustments over time.  
 
30 Farrell and Weiser (2003) discuss when a network’s decision to vertically integrate make vertical leveraging profitable, 
even though it is inefficient from a welfare perspective. This may for instance happen when control over applications helps 
the network operator to engage in price discrimination. 
31 If network architectures would allow for “call termination bypass”, this problem would not occur. See Valletti (2003a) and 
De Bijl et al. (2005) for a discussion in the context of call termination on mobile networks. 
32 A large body of theoretical literature has explored these issues. For a short guide to the literature see Peitz et al. (2004).   23 
It is much simpler to implement than any other pricing rule, also for operators. Thus, the 
simplicity of bill-and-keep will, most likely, make it the preferred choice in practice from a 
welfare perspective.
33 
5.  Universal service 
 
Historically, telecoms has been characterized by a public policy relating to wider social 
benefits, implemented by imposing universal service obligations (USO) on incumbents. In the 
light of the widespread adoption of mobile telephony, typically coupled by license requirements 
related to nationwide coverage, USOs for fixed operators are not cost-effective anymore. As 
Cave et al. (2006) observe, universal service remains only relevant if policy makers redefine it 
to include broadband access. Crawford (2007) strongly supports a revision of universal service 
policy based on the principle that communications regulation should help to encourage diversity 
and innovation as drivers for economic growth for society. According to Crawford, the role of 
universal service policy would be to guarantee that everyone in society has high-speed access to 
the internet, so that the potential to enter into online relationships and communications, and thus 
the potential to generate innovative ideas, is maximized. To conclude, if an adaptation of USOs 
in the communications sector is judged to be appropriate, it is important to do this explicitly 
rather than to automatically extend current policy. Note that typically it is a task of policy 
makers, and not regulators, to assess the desirability of and design USOs.  
6.  Upgrading the institutional environment 
 
It is of crucial importance to see the regulatory challenges discussed above in their institutional 
context. When regulation becomes less specific, the competition authority can take over tasks 
from the NRA. This would stimulate the transfer from an ex ante regulatory regime to ex post 
competition policy. Nevertheless, as discussed in relation to interconnection, efficiency in the 
market can possibly be improved by maintaining some simple, informationally undemanding 
rules that focus on the structure of specific wholesale charges. To do so would ask for ex ante 
regulation, but of a different nature than the detailed rules relying on information about 
underlying cost levels, which is the case for current access regulation? 
Another institutional issue is the reduced need to set media regulation apart, in a market 
composed of converging sectors.
34 Now that consumers substitute surfing on the web with 
watching TV, and that many TV shows can be watched over the internet as well, regulation of 
 
33 Stennek and Tangeras (2007) make a related point in the setting of mobile telecoms, arguing in favour of regulation that is 
simple, undemanding as regards information requirements, and yet powerful. They propose simple rules that focus on the 
structure of prices, not on their level. They refer to this as “structural regulation” that is “both simple to implement and 
transparent to the industry”. The additional property of bill-and-keep is that also the level is fixed, namely all interconnection 
charges at zero. 
34 Noam (2006) discusses how convergence affects regulation of telecoms, internet and media.   24 
electronic communications and of media should be put in one hand. In the UK, this has 
happened with the change from Oftel to Ofcom. Other countries have not followed this example 
yet. In the Netherlands, for instance, it seems that the political climate would make this 
unlikely. 
 
The next section connects the regulatory challenges laid out above to the situation in the 
Netherlands, putting the emphasis on regulation with regard to mandating access to local 
networks.   25 
4  Regulatory challenges: some remarks on the Netherlands 
As was seen in section 2, the Netherlands is in a rather special position of having excellent 
conditions for the viability of competition between infrastructures. There are two nationwide 
networks, DSL and cable, while FTTH is gathering speed quickly—not to mention the potential 
of alternatives like Wi-Fi and WiMAX.
35 The unknown variable is the prospect for network 
access based on LLU, SLU or WBA, which will be determined by KPN’s implementation of its 
all-IP plans as well as OPTA’s requirements with regard to access to the new network. The 
central question should not be how to fine-tune or gradually adapt current access regulation. 
Instead, the issue is how to give the various networks and newcomers stronger incentives to 
invest in their infrastructures. In other words, given the fortunate conditions that are present, 
what is needed to trigger a socially beneficial “race of network investments”? The discussion in 
section 3 suggests that a regime explicitly aiming at regulatory withdrawal (through sunset 
clauses) would do the best job. This will now be made more specific. 
To create a level playing field between the participants of the race, regulation should avoid 
making a distinction between different infrastructures such as DSL and cable (except if 
differences in technologies prevent this). In particular, the current number of networks is 
sufficient to create effective competitive discipline so that network access should not be 
mandated, or it is insufficient, in which case all players should face similar requirements, of 
which access regulation would be a last resort. This would imply a departure from the currently 
applied condition that only players with SMP have to provided access at regulated terms (if 
lighter forms of intervention for those players are deemed to be ineffective). To make this 
possible, the European regulatory framework, to the extent that it is not sufficiently flexible, 
needs to be adapted.
36 However, the European Commission seems to be reluctant to impose 
access regulation with respect to broadband internet access on cable networks infrastructure, as 
it fears to broaden regulation of cable.
37 It would be unfortunate if this implies a continuation of 
asymmetric regulation which no longer appears to be appropriate. 
To make the point above stand up to the scrutiny imposed by real-life details and issues, one 
still has to assess the effectiveness of facilities-based competition as a function of the number of 
players. Distaso et al. (2006) shed some light on this, but more research is needed to investigate 
this issue in more depth. However, the burden of proof should be on the regulator, who should 
motivate why two nationwide networks, providing a priori fairly homogeneous goods, would 
compete too little. An additional pint to be addressed is the risk that due to regulatory 
withdrawal, some entrants may leave the market instead of adapting their business models. To 
prevent bankruptcies that are unnecessarily wasteful (that is, that do not happen as a natural 
outcome of dynamic competition), caution will be needed. 
 
35 De Bijl and Peitz (2005) elaborate on market conditions in the European broadband market. 
36 As pointed out by a referee, the problem may not lie in the regulatory framework, but in the implementation by NRAs or 
the Commission. 
37 See De Streel (2005).   26 
It is useful to comment briefly on how to assess the effectiveness of competition when there are, 
say, two comparable infrastructures. The received wisdom from oligopoly theory says that a 
small number of competing firms results in a certain level of market power. An exception is of 
course price competition among symmetric firms when goods are homogeneous: prices are then 
driven down to marginal costs. If two network operators with unlimited capacity sell “plain” 
broadband access at transparent price structures (e.g. flat fees), one would expect that the 
situation would resemble such price competition. However, if operators implement 
discrimination and prioritization strategies in order to distinguish their offerings, the situation 
would be closer to competition between horizontally differentiated networks, allowing firms to 
charge mark-ups. Thus, such an assessment would boil down to evaluating how homogeneous 
and “neutral” the networks are.
38 Hence in practice, this assessment would require theoretical, 
empirical as well as technological judgments. 
Assuming that a duopoly of fairly homogeneous triple-play providers is characterized by 
sufficient competition, the implication is not that access regulation should be abandoned 
completely. The reason is that one cannot exclude the possibility that in the future, only a single 
network survives because of natural monopoly characteristics in the industry. If that happens, 
access regulation may be a useful tool to maintain and increase competition at the services 
level. The participants in the race should, nevertheless, know in advance that access regulation 
remains a realistic option for the future. To avoid regulatory uncertainty, the conditions and 
terms should be specified in advance. Otherwise, the prospect of regulatory capture may 
discourage them to win the race in the first place. 
From the perspective of a race of network investments, at least at first glance it is not 
evident that one would want to constrain the DSL network in upgrading its network by 
imposing access requirements at specific levels in its network hierarchy. First, the former 
incumbent is no longer a monopolist, nor is it likely to have SMP in the broader, converged 
market of triple play offerings. Second, constraining the incumbent is likely to distort 
innovation decisions by the incumbent, cable operators, and parties active in alternative rollout. 
However, DSL providers that have invested in equipment installed at MDF locations, come into 
trouble if access regulation is put on hold. They see their investments stranded. While this is a 
legitimate reason for concern, the NRA should not automatically give priority to this issue if it 
comes at the cost of important dynamic inefficiencies in the overall market. Note however, 
though, that an NRA may not get enough discretion from the European Commission to follow 




38 See Kocsis and De Bijl (2007) and the discussion on network neutrality above. See also OPTA (2006). 
39 A related, very interesting case concerns the recent amendments to the German telecommunications law that, if the NRA 
follows the intent of Parliament, exempts incumbent Deutsche Telekom’s VDSL network from current access regulation by 
granting the operator a “regulatory holiday”. On 26 February 2007, the European Commission announced that it would 
launch a fast track infringement procedure concerning the amendments in the law. According to the Commission, the new 
law interferes with the NRA’s discretion in defining and analysing markets under EU rules.   27 
The discussion on access regulation in the Netherlands is necessarily brief and requires further 
analysis, in order to make sure that regulation is optimally adapted to the changing landscape. 
Nevertheless, it seems that continuing to base regulatory intervention on the legacy framework 
seriously risks to reduce long-term welfare, by distorting network investments and innovation. 
The other regulatory challenges, while highly relevant, do not pertain specifically to the 
Netherlands. As NRAs and policy makers in any country will have to deal with them, this paper 
does not discuss them in more detail here.   28   29 
5  Conclusion 
A central point in this paper is that in the telecommunications sector, which is characterized by 
rapid technological change, regulation should avoid interfering with market-driven innovation 
as much as possible. Several situations were discussed, indicating that the European regulatory 
framework is not able to optimally address technological change. Note, however, that the 
framework itself may actually be sufficiently flexible, it is at the level of implementation where 
problems come to the surface. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address exactly at which 
level these issues should be addressed.  
The central points were as follows. First of all, regulatory practice may need a drastic 
overhaul in order to be able to accept convergence.
40 The current practice, based on fragmented 
markets definitions, is artificial and not in line with business strategies and consumers’ 
perceptions of electronic services. Voice, internet and TV services are all forms of IP-based 
communication. Thus, this approach introduces serious risks of reducing welfare. Second, 
depending on country-specific characteristics, it may no longer be appropriate to see access 
regulation (and in particular, access regulation of unbundling) as an instrument to promote 
competition and investments by moving entrants upwards on the “ladder of investments”. 
Rather, in countries with good prospects for facilities-based competition (for instance if there is 
national coverage of both DSL and a cable networks) dynamic efficiency may be improved 
substantially by stimulating a race of network investments. This issue may also require an 
overhaul of regulation, this time because of the need for symmetric (de-)regulation with respect 
to mandatory access, irrespective of whether networks have SMP. Additional challenges for 
regulation (and policy) are to consider the option of bill-and-keep for all network 
interconnection, to assess the risks of discriminatory practices that may undermine net 
neutrality of the internet, to reassess the need for universal service obligations, and finally, to 
upgrade the institutional environment in order to implement a transition from ex ante to ex post 
intervention (except in specific cases such as simple interconnection pricing rules, as mentioned 
above). 
This paper discussed regulatory challenges for one particular country, the Netherlands, 
along broad lines. The conclusions may be different for other countries. In general, more 
detailed studies, taking into account country-specific characteristics as well as legal and 
institutional context, would be needed for concrete implementations. Nevertheless, it is hoped 
that the points in this paper contribute to current policy debates. 
 
40 As mentioned in section 3.2, while the update of the European regulatory framework (announced in November 2007) 
substantially reduces the number of predefined markets, it leaves the underlying philosophy unchanged.   30 
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